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453 
PADDLING IN MR. POTTER’S BACKYARD: NAVIGATING 
NEW YORK’S NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT DOCTRINE 
Matthew Ingber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New York’s common law navigable-in-fact doctrine, applica-
ble to non-tidal waterways passing through private property, often 
brings conflict among the interests of landowners and the public.1  In 
these cases, generally, members of the public have entered private 
land to use the non-tidal waterway, leading landowners to bring an 
action for trespass.2  The public response; however, is that no trespass 
was committed because the waterway is navigable-in-fact and, there-
fore, subject to a public easement to use the waterway for transporta-
tion.3  Accordingly, the outcome of these cases depends on a judicial 
determination as to whether the waterway is navigable-in-fact, mean-
ing that the waterway is subject to a public easement, thus negating 
the landowner’s trespass cause of action.4 
The navigable-in-fact doctrine is a remnant of English com-
mon law and New York courts have recognized this doctrine since at 
 
* Matthew Ingber is an associate attorney at Ackerman, O’Brien, Pachman & 
Brown, LLP.  He graduated summa cum laude from Touro College Jacob D. 
Fuchsberg Law Center in 2015 and served as an issue editor on the Touro Law Re-
view.  He would like to thank Professors Rena Seplowitz and Dan Subotnik for 
their assistance with this Article.  In addition, he would like to thank Leonard I. 
Ackerman, Esq., Laura Mulholland, J.D. Candidate 2016, and Allison Dolzani, 
Esq. for their encouragement during the writing process.  
1 See, e.g., Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454 (1866); Adirondack League Club, Inc. 
v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Friends of Thayer Lake LLC. v. 
Brown, 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015); Dale v. Chisholm, 889 
N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009). 
2 See supra note 1. 
3 Supra note 1. 
4 Supra note 1. 
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least 1805.5  Traditionally, New York’s navigable-in-fact doctrine 
examined whether a non-tidal waterway had or was susceptible of 
having practical commercial utility.6  As stated by the New York 
Court of Appeals 1866 decision in Morgan v. King,7 the “public ha[s] 
a right of way in every stream which is capable, in its natural state 
and its ordinary volume of water, of transporting, in a condition fit 
for market, the products of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the 
soil upon its banks.”8  However, as waterways have become less 
commercial in nature,9 New York and other jurisdictions10 have ex-
panded their navigable-in-fact doctrine by permitting evidence of a 
waterway’s “capacity for recreational use.”11 
Evidence of recreational use in a navigability determination 
provides a needed update to the navigable-in-fact approach because it 
recognizes that rivers “are no longer primarily subjects of commer-
 
5 Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
6 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458. 
7 35 N.Y. 454 (1866). 
8 Id. at 459.  Under New York’s statutory Navigation Law, “navigable-in-fact” is 
defined as a waterway that is: 
Navigable in its natural or unimproved condition, affording a 
channel for useful commerce of a substantial and permanent 
character conducted in the customary mode of trade and travel on 
water.  A theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is tem-
porary, precarious and unprofitable is not sufficient, but to be 
navigable in fact a lake or stream must have practical usefulness 
to the public as a highway for transportation. 
N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2016).  While this definition is similar to the 
one established in Morgan v King, the statute does not apply to waterways whose 
beds and banks are privately owned. See infra Section II.  In addition, the statutory 
Navigation Law applies to “the use of navigable waters of the state,” N.Y. NAV. 
LAW § 1 (McKinney 2016), and the “[n]avigable waters of the state” includes “all 
lakes, rivers, streams and waters within the boundaries of the state and not privately 
owned . . . .” Id. § 2(4).  Thus, common law principles—and not the Navigation 
Law—control when analyzing whether a non-tidal waterway over private property 
is or is not navigable-in-fact and thus subject to a public navigable easement. 
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 508.  However, the Navigation Law helped 
persuade the New York Court of Appeals when it held that evidence of recreational 
use of a waterway may be considered in a navigable-in-fact analysis.  Adirondack 
League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195; see infra Section III.B.ii.a. 
9 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195. 
10 See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Ark. 1980); State ex rel v. New-
port Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
11 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
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cial exploitation.”12  However, by including recreational transporta-
tion, New York courts may have broadened13 the category of water-
ways subject to the public navigable easement, which may, in turn, 
“destabilize long-established expectations as to the nature of private 
ownership.”14  In particular, the New York Court of Appeals decision 
in Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club15 (ALC) and a recent 
opinion by the Third Department in Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. 
Brown,16 have put the scope of the navigable-in-fact doctrine into 
question.  Both cases involved paddlers who entered private property 
and argued that the waterway was navigable-in-fact, and therefore, 
subject to a public easement.17  In both cases, the court considered the 
recreational use of the waterway in its navigable-in-fact analysis.18  
The courts, however, stated that including recreational use “neither 
altered nor enlarged the applicable common-law analysis and was in 
line with the traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river 
has a practical utility for trade or travel.”19  This proposition is doubt-
ful.  As discussed throughout this Article, the manner in which recre-
 
12 Id. at 1195. 
13 The court, in Adirondack League Club held that “evidence of the river’s capac-
ity for recreational use is in line with the traditional test of navigability, that is, 
whether a river has practical utility for trade or travel.” 706 N.E.2d at 1194.  The 
court then stated it was not “broaden[ing] the standard for navigability-in-fact, but 
[was] merely recogniz[ing] that recreational use fits within in.”  Id. at 1195. 
14 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512 n.5; c.f. Douglaston Manor v. Bah-
rakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 204 (N.Y. 1997) (stating that accepting defendant’s position 
“would precipitate serious destabilizing effects on property ownership and prece-
dents”). 
15 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998). 
16 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
17 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193; Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 
N.Y.S.3d at 506. 
18 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Friends of 
Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
19 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509 (quoting Adirondack League Club, 
Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194).  It is debatable whether New York courts would have 
considered recreational use as a practical utility in their navigable-in-fact analysis 
based on (1) the emphasis that early New York cases placed on commercial utility; 
and (2) that other jurisdictions were already including recreational use in their nav-
igability analysis as early as 1871, while pre-twentieth century New York cases fail 
to even mention recreational use of waterways. Id.  See, e.g., Attorney General v. 
Woods, 108 Mass. 436, 440 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1871) (“If water is navigable for pleas-
ure boating, it must be regarded as navigable water, though no craft has ever been 
upon it for the purposes of trade or agriculture.”). 
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ational use evidence has been analyzed, beginning with the Court of 
Appeals decision in ALC, has improperly enlarged the navigable-in-
fact doctrine and is not in line with its traditional commercial utility 
foundations. 
This Article will examine the navigable-in-fact doctrine as 
applied in New York with a focus on the types of evidence required 
for non-tidal waterways to be declared navigable.  In addition, the 
Article will discuss, among others, the decisions in ALC and Friends 
of Thayer Lake LLC in connection with whether recreational use 
alone can support a navigability determination.  Although both deci-
sions did not expressly make such a holding, their reasoning suggests 
that evidence of recreational use—without a showing of commercial 
utility—is enough for a court to find a waterway navigable.20  Im-
portantly, the navigable-in-fact standard has changed after these deci-
sions.  Instead of the requirements set forth in Morgan, it is probable 
that the evidence now needed to declare a waterway navigable-in-fact 
include: (1) whether a waterway in its natural state and ordinary vol-
ume can permit commercial activity21 or (2) whether “substantially 
unobstructed travel on [a waterway] can occur periodically or sea-
sonally.”22  Accordingly, a court will find that a waterway has practi-
cal public utility upon satisfying one of these factors, which, in turn, 
will lead to a determination that a waterway is navigable-in-fact.23  
The proponent of the navigable easement will also be able to meet his 
or her burden by proffering evidence of recreational use, such as 
kayaking or canoeing, to satisfy either of the two aforementioned 
practical utility criteria.24 
Section II of the Article considers navigable waterways gen-
erally by first examining English common law.  It then compares wa-
terways that are navigable-in-law and navigable-in-fact.  Section III 
 
20 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Friends of 
Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
21 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197. 
22 Id. 
23 For example, the court in Adirondack League Club first determined that the 
evidence did not establish that the subject waterway in its natural state and ordinary 
volume have the capacity for commercial activity. Id. at 1196.  Rather than ending 
its analysis, the court then examined whether the waterway could support “substan-
tially unobstructed travel” either seasonally or periodically. Id. at 1197. 
24 See, e.g., Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509, 511 (finding that recrea-
tional kayaking is sufficient to establish that a waterway can support uninterrupted 
travel and that it has the capacity for trade). 
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examines New York’s navigable-in-fact doctrine, starting with a 
comprehensive discussion of New York’s navigable-in-fact rule of 
law and the evidence required to establish that a non-tidal waterway 
is navigable.  It then analyzes New York case law beginning with the 
Court of Appeals decision in Morgan v. King followed by its proge-
ny.  This analysis seeks to achieve two objectives.  First, it shows that 
including recreational use as a factor in a navigability determination 
is consistent with precedent because New York courts have always 
taken a pragmatic approach to navigability-in-fact law.  This is ex-
emplified by the court in Morgan breaking English precedent to 
adopt a rule of law that specifically addressed the needs and concerns 
of New Yorkers at that time.  Second, examining New York prece-
dent reveals that there was originally a focus on practical commercial 
utility when deciding whether a waterway was navigable-in-fact.  
However, recent decisions by the courts in ALC and Friends of 
Thayer Lake have extended the navigable-in-fact doctrine whereby 
evidence of recreational use alone is now enough for a waterway to 
be deemed navigable without considering commercial utility.  Final-
ly, the Article concludes that the recent pattern by New York courts 
of expanding the navigable-in-fact doctrine to include recreational 
use leaves landowners with an expectation that waterways situated on 
their property are subject to navigable public easements.  It is unlike-
ly that this judicial pattern will change nor is it probable for the legis-
lature to intervene as it is New York’s policy to preserve water re-
sources that the state holds in trust, which includes a duty to 
maximize their enjoyment. 
II. NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS: NAVIGABLE-IN-LAW AND 
NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT 
A public easement over navigable waterways is rooted in the 
public trust doctrine and English common law.25  Under English 
common law, navigable waterways included only those waters “in 
 
25 Timothy J. Zeilman, Connecticut by Canoe: Navigability in the Nutmeg State, 
84 CONN. B.J. 305, 305-06 (2010); HENRY JOHN WASTELL COULSON & URQUHART 
ATWELL FORBES, THE LAW RELATING TO WATERS, SEA, TIDAL, AND INLAND 444 
(1880) (stating the Crown owns the bed of navigable waterways “for the benefit of 
the [public], and [the waterway] cannot be used in any manner so as to derogate 
from or interfere with the right of navigation, which belongs by law to the subjects 
of the realm”) [hereinafter COULSON & FORBES]. 
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which the tide flows and reflows; all others are not navigable.”26  
These tidal waterways, sometimes referred to as navigable-in-law, 
which were owned by the king.  The king who “held the beds and 
waters in trust for the public, with all citizens having access to and 
use of the common resource.”27  Importantly, navigable-in-fact wa-
terways, whether under English common law or New York law, pro-
vide the public with: (1) the right to use the waterway “for the pur-
pose of passage or transportation”28 and (2) the right to take fish from 
the waters.29   
On the other hand, those waterways that English law deemed 
not navigable (non-tidal water) belonged “to the owner of the adja-
cent soil” rather than the king.30  According to Chancellor Kent’s un-
derstanding of Lord Hale’s treatise, de jure mairs, “fresh [water] riv-
ers, as well as those which ebb and flow, may be under the servitude 
of the public interest, and may be of common or public use for the 
carriage of boats, &c. and in that sense may be regarded as common 
highways by water.”31  In addition, and unlike those waterways 
deemed navigable-in-law, a waterway that is navigable-in-fact does 
not “divest the owners of the adjacent banks of their exclusive rights 
to the fisheries therein.”32 
Based on these principles, the English common law distin-
 
26 Morgan, 354 N.Y. at 458 (emphasis added).  “The common law of England 
considers a river, in which the tide ebbs and flows, an arm of the sea, as navigable, 
and devoted to the public use, for all purposes, as well for navigation as for fish-
ing.” Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).  For example, 
in Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), New York’s highest 
court was presented with the issue of whether the defendants committed a nuisance 
when they constructed a mill on the Hudson River. Id. at 307.  Chancellor Kent 
stated that “[t]he Hudson at Stillwater is a fresh river, not navigable in the common 
law sense of the term, for the tide does not ebb and flow at that place.” Id. at 318 
(opinion of Kent, Ch.) (emphases in original). 
27 Zeilman, supra note 25 at 305. 
28 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458. 
29 See supra note 14; Douglaston Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 203 (stating that the 
common law did not “divest the owners of the adjacent banks of their exclusive 
rights to the fisheries therein”).  The public easement in navigable-in-fact water-
ways, however, does not include the right to fish. See infra text accompanying note 
29. 
30 Morgan, 35 N.Y. 458. 
31 Palmer, 3 Cai at 319 (opinion of Kent, Ch.); see also Maureen E. Brady, 
“Navigability”: Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Private Rights in Water-
ways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1421-23 (2015). 
32 Douglaston Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 203. 
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guished between tidal and non-tidal waterways.  The soil of tidal wa-
terways was owned by the king and held in public trust, and the pub-
lic had an easement/servitude to use the water for transportation and 
fishing.33  In contrast, English law considered fresh water to be non-
navigable and the adjacent property owner, rather than the king, 
owned the soil beneath the water.34  But even with non-tidal waters, 
the public, although not having a right to fish in non-tidal water, still 
retained servitude to use these waterways for transportation of “boats, 
lighters or rafts.”35 
III. NEW YORK’S NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT DOCTRINE 
After the American Revolution, the “people of the State in 
their right of sovereignty succeeded to the royal title” over the wa-
terways.36 American courts continued to apply the English common 
law to tidal waters, but the English definition of navigable waterway 
was too limited due to the thousands of non-tidal rivers, streams, and 
lakes of North America that were actually or susceptible of being 
used as highways for commerce.37  Accordingly, American courts 
began to modify the English navigability standard by expanding the 
scope of the public easement to include non-tidal waterways.38  The 
remainder of this Section examines New York’s navigable-in-fact 
precedent and focuses on the type of evidence that will support a nav-
igable-in-fact determination. 
A. New York’s Navigable-in-Fact Rule 
For non-tidal waterways located on private property to be 
navigable-in-fact, the “paramount concern is the capacity of the river 
 
33 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.; see, e.g., COULSON & FORBES, supra note 25, at 78 (stating that “the right 
of navigation is . . . similar to the right which the public [has] to passage along a 
public road, and involves no right of property in the bed or banks.”). 
36 People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877); c.f. 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. Law § 15-0103(1) (McKinney 2016) (“The sovereign pow-
er to regulate and control the water resources of this state ever since its establish-
ment has been and now is vested exclusively in the state of New York . . . ”). 
37 Zeilman, supra note 25, at 306-08. 
38 See Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459 (expanding New York’s navigable-in-fact doctrine 
from the English common law to include waterways capable of floating logs in a 
condition fit for market). 
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for transport, whether for trade or travel.”39  This practical utility 
standard requires the proponent of the navigable public easement to 
demonstrate that the waterway has “actual practical use or evidence 
of capacity for practical use.”40  In that connection, practical utility 
for a waterway’s capacity for trade or transport is established if the 
river: 
1.  Is actually or is capable;41 
 
2.  “In its natural state; 
 
3.  And in its ordinary volume of water;42 
 
4.  Of transporting in a condition fit for market the prod-
ucts of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the soil 
upon its banks”43 or has the “capacity for recreational 
use”44; 
 
5.  For a sufficient length of time during the year so that 
the waterway has practical public utility.45 
 
In addition, it is not necessary that property being transported 
be carried in vessels.46  If it is so far navigable or floatable,47 in its 
 
39 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195; Mohawk Valley Ski Club 
v. Town of Duanesbug, 757 N.Y.S.2d 357, 304 A.D.2d 881, 883 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 2003). 
40 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.  See also The Daniel Ball, 
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (stating that rivers are “navigable in fact when they 
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways 
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted”). 
41 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.  Evidence of a river’s actual use or evidence of a riv-
er’s capacity can be established by, inter alia, “experts in geology, hydrology, eco-
nomics, fluvial geomorphology, and even expert canoers and river guides.” Adi-
rondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196. 
42 As to this factor, the court in Morgan only required that a waterway’s “naviga-
ble capacity ordinarily continue a sufficient length of time to make it useful as a 
highway” for it to be deemed “subject to the public easement.” 35 N.Y. at 459. 
43 Id. 
44 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
45 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459; Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196-
97. 
46 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
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natural state and its ordinary capacity, as to be of public use in the 
transportation of property, the public claim to such use ought to be 
liberally supported.48 
Assuming the five factors above are satisfied, this alone does 
not establish that a waterway is navigable-in-fact because “[t]he pub-
lic right to use navigable waters does not entitle the public to cross 
private land for access to navigable waters.”49  In addition, “the exist-
ence or absence of [multiple] termini at and from which the public 
may enter or leave the waterway“50 may be determinative as to 
whether there is or is not a public easement.51  For example, in Hani-
gan v. State,52 the Appellate Division, Third Department held that a 
pond was not navigable-in-fact because it lacked multiple termini.53  
Therefore, the court found that the pond lacked public utility for 
transportation because “the canoe and small boats that used Stewart 
Pond traveled nowhere” as there was only one navigable access 
 
47 For a discussion of the court rationale in Morgan for extending English com-
mon law by permitting a waterway to be declared navigable-in-fact based on its ca-
pacity to float logs to market, see infra Section III.B. 
48 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459 (emphasis added). 
49 Hanigan v. State, 629 N.Y.S.2d 509, 511 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995).  In 
Friends of Thayer Lake, for example, the “plaintiffs’ property is bounded” to the 
north by a wilderness area. 1 N.Y.S.3d at 506.  The wilderness contained two lakes 
and permitted paddlers to “travel across a network of lakes, ponds, streams, and ca-
noe carry trails” that ultimately encroached onto the waterways situated on the nor-
therly boundary of plaintiff’s property. Id.  This trail would later be known as the 
“Lila Traverse Section of the Whitney Loop.” Id.  From 1851 to 1997, the wilder-
ness area was privately owned; thus, paddlers lacked a public access point and 
could not use the Lila Traverse and thus use plaintiffs’ waterways without first 
trespassing on the wilderness area. Id.  In 1998; however, New York State pur-
chased the wilderness area, thereby permitting kayakers to enter the two lakes lo-
cated on the now public wilderness area and paddle along the Lila Traverse without 
having to first cross private land before reaching the navigable waterways situated 
on plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 506, 512. 
50  John A. Humbach, Public Rights in the Navigable Streams of New York, 6 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 517-18 (1989); Fairchild v. Kraemer, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 
826 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1960); Mohawk Valley Ski Club, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 360. 
51 Compare Hanigan, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (“[T]he absence of a second access is 
further evidence that the pond is not suitable for trade, commerce, or travel.”), with 
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512 (finding the waterway at issue to be 
navigable, in part, because the private property in which the waterway is situated 
on “adjoins public property at both of its termini”). 
52 629 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995). 
53 Id. at 512. 
9
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point.54 
The public easement afforded to navigable-in-fact waterways 
also “carries with it the incidental privilege to make use, when abso-
lutely necessary of the bed and banks, including the right to portage 
on riparian lands.”55  Therefore, even if the ability to travel along the 
waterway is interrupted by “occasional natural obstructions,” this will 
not prevent a court from declaring a waterway navigable and subject 
to a public easement.56  For example, in Friends of Thayer Lake, the 
Third Department found that neither the recreational kayaker’s “rela-
tively short portage around the waterway’s rapids nor the presence of 
other incidental obstacles such as beaver dams and fallen trees ren-
dered the waterway nonnavigable.”57 
Finally, a judicial determination that a waterway located on 
private property is navigable-in-fact does not amount to a taking un-
der New York’s constitution.58  As previously stated, the navigable-
in-fact doctrine is a remnant of the English public trust doctrine and 
after the America Revolution, New York and the other original 
twelve states, “inherited ownership of the public trust waters within 
its boundaries from the king.”59  In that connection, a determination 
that a waterway is navigable-in-fact is that [the water-
way] has always been open to the public in that char-
acter, even though the riparian owners may not have 
believed it to be, and no trespass was committed by a 
traveler who navigated upon it before a court ruled 
upon its navigability.60 
B. Morgan v. King - Expanding the English Common 
Law to Satisfy Commercial Needs 
The 1866 New York Court of Appeals decision in Morgan v. 
King examined the implications of non-tidal waterways running over 
 
54 Id. 
55 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197. 
56 Id. at 1197; People ex rel. Eric R.R. v. State Tax Comm’n, 43 N.Y.S.2d 189, 
191 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1943). 
57 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510 (quotation altered). 
58 Douglaston Manor v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 204-05 (N.Y. 1997); Adiron-
dack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196. 
59 See Zeilman, supra note 25, at 305-06. 
60 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 508. 
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private property, and has become the seminal case in the State in 
connection with the navigable-in-fact doctrine.  The significance of 
the decision is two-fold.  First, it established New York’s common 
law navigable-in-fact rule of law.61  Second, if not equally important, 
the Court of Appeals broke away from the English common law by 
adopting a rule that considered the “peculiar character of [New 
York’s] streams” and the important utility in transporting people and 
goods to market.62 
In Morgan, the defendants owned land over a portion of the 
non-tidal Raquette River that passed along their property and were 
concededly the riparian owners.63  The defendants, believing they 
were lawfully exercising their right to use their land, constructed a 
dam along the river, which ultimately obstructed the passage of the 
plaintiffs’ logs that were being floated down the stream.64 
The issue was “whether the Raquette River is, of public right, 
a common highway, at the point where its waters are obstructed by 
the defendants’ dam.”65  The court explained that if the water over the 
defendants’ property were subject to a public easement, meaning nav-
igable-in-fact, then the defendants’ use of their property (building the 
dam) would make them liable for interfering with the plaintiffs’ right, 
as members of the public, to use the waterway for transportation.66 
To answer this question, the court analyzed the characteristics 
of the 161 mile long Raquette River, paying particular attention to the 
section of the river between Colton and Raymondsville, the site of 
defendants’ dam.67  The first twenty miles of the river, from its mouth 
to Raymondsville, was boatable and had already been declared a nav-
igable public highway.68  For the next fourteen miles, from Ray-
 
61 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
62 Id. at 458.  The New York Court of Appeals in Adirondack League Club, Inc. 
v. Sierra Club used similar reasoning when including recreational use as a factor in 
the navigable-in-fact analysis by recognizing that rivers no longer serve as “sub-
jects of commercial exploitation and gain but instead are valued in their own right 
as a means of travel.” Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 
1192, 1195 (N.Y. 1998). 
63 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 456, 458. 
64 Id. at 456. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (finding that if “the river is not a common highway,” then the river is not 
navigable and the defendants would not be liable to the plaintiffs for committing 
the tort of nuisance). 
67 Id. 455-60. 
68 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 455-56. 
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mondsville to Potsdam, “the bed of the river is rocky, and rises two 
hundred and fifty feet, and the stream is rapid and rough.”69  From 
Potsdam to Colton, which consisted of the next nine miles, the river’s 
bed would rise four hundred feet.70 
The court’s analysis began with a clear departure from Eng-
lish common law.71  Under English law, a river is navigable-in-fact 
when “boats, lighters or rafts may be floated to market”72; nothing 
under English law provided for floating logs.73  Accordingly, had the 
court relied on English law, the Raquette River would not have been 
navigable because it was not capable of carrying to market “the prod-
ucts of the forest or mines, or the tillage of the soil upon its bank” in 
any of the three types of craft previously mentioned.74 
The court found that limiting the evidence to the capacity of a 
river to float boats, lighters, and rafts was too restrictive given “the 
peculiar character of [New York’s] streams, and the commerce for 
which they may be used.”75  Thus, English law did not fit the needs 
of New Yorkers and the court agreed with the plaintiffs that “the nat-
ural capacity of the river to float sawlogs and timber, in single pieces, 
to market, in seasons of high water” was of significant public utili-
ty.76  It rationalized this policy determination by emphasizing that ex-
panding the navigable-in-fact criteria was commercially necessary.77  
For example, had the court not expanded the English law and instead 
limited the public easement to “navigation by boats or rafts,” then 
there would be no avenue for New York’s valuable products, primari-
ly timber, to reach the market.78 
The Court of Appeals then established a new navigable-in-
fact standard, balancing the rights of private property owners to ex-
clude others from entering their land and using the waterway against 
the public need to transport property/goods to market.79  The court, 
stressing commercial utility, found “that the public ha[s] a right of 
 
69 Id. at 456. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 458. 
72 Id. 
73 See Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458. 
74 Id. at 458-59. 
75 Id. at 458. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 459. 
78 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
79 Id. 
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way in every stream which is capable, in its natural state and its ordi-
nary volume of water, of transporting, in a condition fit for market, 
the products of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the soil upon 
its banks.”80  The court also eliminated the vessel requirement by 
permitting “the property to be transported” if it could ordinarily float 
to market without the human guidance.81  Accordingly, if a waterway 
is “navigable or floatable, in its natural state and its ordinary capaci-
ty, as to be of public use in the transportation of property, the public 
claim to such use ought to be liberally supported.”82 
The court also provided an evidentiary standard for determin-
ing (1) when a waterway can sufficiently float logs to market and (2) 
when a waterway has a sufficient natural capacity to support the pub-
lic navigation easement.83  First, the proponent of the navigable 
easement may show that “the property to be transported” could be 
floated along the waterway so long as it could ordinarily float to mar-
ket without the guidance of man.84  This criterion, just like the rea-
soning for expanding the English law, stressed the commercial utility 
of the waterway because it was necessary that the logs float to market 
without being damaged.85  If the logs were capable of floating but 
during its course would be rendered unmarketable due to damage, 
then the waterway would lack practical utility.  Therefore, the public 
would not be benefitted and the court would not be justified to inter-
fere with a landowner’s private property by subjecting it to a public 
navigable easement.  Second, for a river to have sufficient ordinary 
capacity to make it useful to the public, it is not necessary “that its 
ordinary state, at all seasons of the year, should be such as to make it 
navigable.”86  It is only necessary that the “periods of high water or 
navigable capacity continue a sufficient length of time to make it use-
ful as a highway.”87 
In applying this new, commercially focused standard, the 
court analyzed the portion of the Raquette River between Colton and 





83 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
84 Id. 
85 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 460. 
86 Id. at 459. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 460. 
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rules,” the section of the river at issue could not be found navigable 
based on (a) the river not having the ordinary capacity to transport 
products for a sufficient amount of time during the year and, (b) even 
if it the logs could be safely floated to market, they required the aid 
of artificial improvements.89 
First, the court determined that the section of the River “was 
not capable of floating even single logs, except during seasons of 
high water, which were about two months in a year.”90  Additionally, 
even during those two months, the river’s rapids and rocks made 
floating goods to market so unpredictable that men were required to 
aid the logs to ensure that they arrived safely to market.91  The court 
stated that “[i]t would be going beyond warrant of either principle or 
precedent to hold that a floatable capacity, so temporary, precarious 
and unprofitable, constituted the stream a public highway.”92  Se-
cond, the court found that it was immaterial that dams were subse-
quently built along the Raquette River and logs were now capable of 
being floated safely to market.93  The court stated that the capacity of 
waterway for navigable-in-fact purposes must be analyzed based on 
the natural state of the river without consideration of any natural im-
provements made thereto.94 
C. Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club – 
Recreational Use 
The New York Court of Appeals reexamined the State’s navi-
gable-in-fact doctrine and evidentiary requirements in Adirondack 
League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club.95  The significance of this decision 
rests in its holding: “that evidence of [a river’s] capacity for recrea-
tional use is in line with the traditional test of navigability, that is 
whether a river has a practical utility for trade or travel.”96  However, 
 
89 Id. 
90 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 460. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  This reasoning reflects the Morgan court’s commercial focus in its analy-
sis.  The court found that such a short term of two weeks whereby the natural state 
of the river could potentially float logs to market did not serve a practical public 
utility to justify burdening private land with a public easement. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998). 
96 Id. at 1194 (emphasis added). 
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this holding unnecessarily expanded New York’s navigable-in-fact 
law.  First, the court could have reached the same conclusion in over-
turning the appellate court’s summary judgment order without such a 
broad holding.  Second, the holding provided a doctrinal foundation 
for subsequent lower courts, such as Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. 
Brown,97 to find waterways navigable-in-fact by relying, not on 
commerce, but on evidence relating to recreational use.98 
In addition, the court in ALC found that recreational use is in 
line with the traditional test of navigability by examining if there is 
“practical utility for trade or travel.”99  This finding is misguided.  
The traditional test in Morgan focused on practical commercial utili-
ty, and such utility was determined by whether goods could be trans-
ported on a river and thus be traded in the marketplace.100  In Mor-
gan, travelling/floating along the waterway was thus a necessary 
condition for the goods/timber to be subsequently traded.101  Nothing 
in the Morgan decision lends itself to the proposition that the tradi-
tional test looked to the disjunctive, meaning that practical public 
utility would be satisfied if goods could be transported or traded on a 
river.102  The ALC court’s assurance “that evidence of [a] river’s ca-
pacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional test of navi-
gability, that is, whether a river has practical utility for trade or trav-
el”103 is therefore not an accurate reflection of the navigable-in-fact 
doctrine.104  This new practical utility criterion displaces Morgan’s 
commercial utility standard with a utility that can be satisfied solely 
on travel as a court can now declare a waterway navigable-in-fact 
based on a finding that a river can support individual canoeing 
trips.105  The remainder of this case discussion will provide: (i) the 
facts and procedural background of the case; (ii) the Court of Ap-
peals’ rationale for including recreational use in the navigable-in-fact 
 
97 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015). 
98 Id. at 27. 
99 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
100 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
101 Id. at 458-59. 
102 The Adirondack League Club’s practical utility criterion of trade or travel was 
relied on by the court in Friends of Thayer Lake, when it stated that the test of a 
waterway’s practical utility “is phrased in the disjunctive,” looking to its capacity 
for trade or travel. Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510. 
103 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
104 Compare Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
105 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198. 
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analysis; (iii) an examination of how the court analyzed the evidence, 
with particular attention on recreational use; and (iv) how the court’s 
holding was unnecessarily broad. 
1. Facts and The Third Department’s Decision 
The defendants in ALC made a single recreational trip along 
the South Branch of the Moose River (the “South Branch”) by kayak 
and canoe.106  The trip began and ended with the defendants entering 
land owned by the State of New York, thus the waterway had multi-
ple termini by which the public could gain access without trespassing 
onto private land.107  Relevant to the dispute is that twelve miles of 
the expedition required the defendants to pass through land owned by 
plaintiff Adirondack League Club, Inc. (ALC Inc.).108  According to 
the defendants, “about 76% of the segment of the river that runs 
through plaintiff’s property is easily paddled by novice canoeists and 
the remainder of the river requires intermediate skill.”109  In addition, 
the South Branch’s depth varied depending on the season, “with an 
average depth of three to four feet.”110 
Procedurally, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment ar-
guing that the defendants trespassed on their private property, while 
the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the twelve-mile stretch of the South Branch is navigable-in-fact 
and, therefore, subject to a public easement.111  The record revealed 
 
106 Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994) [hereinafter ALC App. Div.], aff’d as modified by Adi-
rondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998). 
107 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 790.  This fact, although not in dispute in the 
case, establishes that the Moose River had multiple termini, and none of which re-
quired the defendants to trespass in order to gain access to the waterway. See Adi-
rondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193. 
108 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193.  The Adirondack League 
Club, Inc. is a private club with about four hundred members and for over a century 
has sought to exclude the public from navigating the segment of the South Branch 
located on its property.  ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S. at 789. 
109 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90 (emphasis added).  That novice ca-
noeists could easily paddle the segment of the South Branch at issue.  It should 
have been analyzed by the court as evidence that the waterway has practical public 
utility because it can be enjoyed by recreationalists of all skill levels.  See discus-
sion infra Section III.D.iii. 
110 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 790. 
111 Id. 
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that during the first half of the twentieth century the South Branch 
had been “one of the five busiest rivers in New York” and was heavi-
ly used to transport goods to market.112  In addition, both parties 
agreed that the South Branch was used for floating logs to market 
during the end of the nineteenth century until 1948.113 
However, the natural capacity of the South Branch was in 
dispute, as the parties disagreed on whether the pre-1948 commercial 
transportation was aided by artificial improvements.114  A network of 
dams was built during the turn of the century, but because the re-
mains of only a few of the structures still existed and the parties 
failed to present evidence on how the dams were used, there was a 
question of fact regarding the natural capacity of the river to float 
logs to market.115  The plaintiff, seeking to prove that the South 
Branch lacked commercial utility in its natural condition, provided an 
affidavit from an historian showing that the historical log-drives on 
the South Branch were possible because of the artificial dam sys-
tem.116  The plaintiff also argued that the log-drives lasted only a few 
weeks per year because “the current was unpredictable, and impeded 
by rocks and rapids.”117 
On the other hand, the defendants argued that the natural ca-
pacity of the river was suitable for commercial transportation not-
withstanding the construction of the dams.118  The defendants pre-
sented log-drive contracts from 1926 to 1948 that prohibited the 
construction of dams on the South Branch.119  Additionally, the de-
fendants argued that the historical log-drives lasted only a few weeks 
per year because that was all that was bargained for, not because the 
river was incapable of additional log-drives.120 
The defendants also presented evidence that recreationalists 
had recently kayaked the portion of the South Branch at issue.121  The 
purpose of the evidence was to show that because the South Branch 
could be kayaked for recreational use, the network of dams was not 
 
112 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195. 
113 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791. 
114 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197. 
115 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791. 
116 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197. 
117 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791. 
118 Id. at 792. 
119 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197. 
120 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791. 
121 Id. at 791-92. 
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necessary to enable logs to float safely to market during the pre-1948 
log-drives.122  Therefore, the natural state of the river—since it could 
support recreational kayaking—could have also supported the log-
drives, making the river susceptible to such future commercial use.  
The Third Department permitted this evidence and found that recrea-
tional use in a navigable-in-fact determination is consistent with New 
York’s recent legislative policy of conserving and developing “the 
waters of this State for all public beneficial uses, which include use 
for recreational purposes.”123 
The Appellate Division concluded that the South Branch was 
navigable-in-fact and granted the defendants motion for summary 
judgment.124  Its determination was based on the “undisputed evi-
dence of the river’s historic use as a major log-driving stream for 
some 50 years and its recent use by recreational canoeists.”125  Inter-
estingly, it appears that the court could have based its grant of sum-
mary judgment establishing the waterway as navigable-in-fact on one 
of two grounds: either the historical log-drives or the recent recrea-
tional use of the river.126 
2. The New York Court of Appeals 
The issue before the Court of Appeals in ALC was to “what 
extent recreational use can be considered in determining whether a 
 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 791; see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0105(2) (McKinney 
2016). 
124 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 792-93. 
125 Id. at 792. 
126 Id.  However, in a subsequent decision by the Third Department, the court 
stated that its holding in Adirondack League Club v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 778 
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994), “did not alter the established standard for determining 
navigability so as to permit a determination of navigability based solely upon a wa-
terway’s suitability and capacity for recreational use.”  Hanigan v. State, 629 
N.Y.S.2d 509, 512 n.* (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995).  Three years after Hanigan, 
Judge Bellacosa’s dissent in the New York Court of Appeals decision in Adiron-
dack League Club adds confusion to whether recreational use alone can support a 
public navigable easement when he credited the “Appellate Division majority’s 
double-barreled justification that . . . the river’s historic use as a major log-driving 
stream . . . and its recent use by recreational canoeists” justifies the South Branch’s 
navigable-in-fact status.  706 N.E.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (N.Y. 1998) (Bellacosa, J., 
dissenting). 
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river is navigable-in-fact.”127  The plaintiffs predictably argued that 
navigability contemplates whether a river has commercial utility, and 
the Third Department should have only analyzed the log-drives that 
took place on the South Branch until 1948, excluding the evidence 
relating to recreational use.128  In that connection, the plaintiffs also 
argued that expanding the navigable-in-fact doctrine by allowing evi-
dence of recreational use “would disrupt settled expectations regard-
ing private property and would expand the common-law rule beyond 
its traditional foundation.”129 
The remainder of this case discussion will examine: (a) the 
court’s rationale for including recreational use in a navigable-in-fact 
analysis and (b) how the court analyzed the evidence when holding 
that summary judgment was improper.  It will argue that allowing 
recreational use as evidence is not unprecedented, as New York 
courts have considered recreational boating in navigability determi-
nations since at least 1960.130  What is new, however, is that the 
court’s holding deemphasized the commercial utility aspect of the 
navigable-in-fact analysis, and instead measured practical utility on 
transportation, whether for trade or travel.131 
a. Recreational Use and The Navigable-
in-Fact Doctrine 
The Court of Appeals first addressed the threshold issue—
whether recreational use could be considered in a navigability deter-
mination.132  In holding that it can, the court found “that evidence of 
the river’s capacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional 
test of navigability, that is, whether a river has practical utility for 
trade or travel.”133  This holding, however, is put into question be-
cause the court later restated its holding but applied a different practi-
cal utility standard.134  The court later stated that it was only holding 
 
127 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193. 
128 Id. at 1194. 
129 Id. 
130 See Fairchild, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 823 (“The fact that a stream has been used for 
pleasure boating may be considered on the subject of the stream’s capacity and the 
use of which it is susceptible.”); Humbach, supra note 50, at 473-74. 
131 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
132 Id. at 1193-94. 
133 Id. at 1194 (emphasis added). 
134 Id. at 1194-96. 
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“that such transport need not be limited to moving goods in com-
merce, but can include some recreational uses.  Practical utility for 
travel or transport remains the standard.”135 
The court’s two articulations of its holding are inconsistent as 
the former judged practical utility on trade or travel, while the latter 
required travel or transport.  The latter holding is an even further de-
parture from Morgan’s commercial navigable-in-fact doctrine be-
cause it likens public utility to travel or transport, two factors with no 
distinction and completely disregards trade—a critical criterion in 
Morgan.136  Importantly, a criterion of (a) trade or travel or (b) travel 
or transport opens the door to recreational use alone supporting a 
navigable-in-fact determination.  Without presenting evidence on 
whether a waterway is capable of supporting public utility for trade, a 
party now seeking to hold a waterway navigable-in-fact can simply 
show that he was able to kayak a river when he recreationally trav-
eled from one access point to the other. 
In any event, the court reached its holding by applying a mod-
ern approach such as, whether a river serves a practical public utili-
ty.137  The court stated that when Morgan was decided in 1866, a riv-
er’s practical utility was measured by whether it could serve as a 
commercial highway to transport goods to market.138  Strictly adher-
ing to the Morgan commercial practical utility criteria would ignore 
the fact that trucks have replaced rivers as the primary mode of trans-
porting goods.139  It would also ignore the “changing attitudes toward 
the preservation of our natural resources.”140  For example, when 
Morgan was decided, rivers were primarily valued as “subjects of 
exploitation and gain,” but rivers are now “valued in their own right 
as a means of travel.”141 
 
135 Id. at 1196 (emphasis added). 
136 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
137 Id. at 1194-95; Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458. 
138 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194-95. 
139 Id. at 1195; Brady, supra note 31, at 1426-27 (stating that because waterways 
are no longer a primary method of transporting goods to market, “courts that meas-
ure navigability by floating logs are thus left with a definition that bears no rela-
tionship to actual or future use of waters”). 
140 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195. 
141 Id.  It is doubtful that rivers are now valued for traveling but were not when 
Morgan was decided in 1866.  The court in Morgan focused on the type of travel-
ing at issue, i.e., commercial, when it expanded the navigable-in-fact doctrine to the 
detriment of private property rights. Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.  The court in ALC, 
20
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The court also rejected ALC Inc.’s. argument that Morgan 
supports the conclusion that the sole factor in determining whether a 
waterway is navigable-in-fact is whether it is capable of carrying 
goods to market.142  The court explained that Morgan and the Naviga-
tion Law definition “have as their touchstone the idea that a river 
must have ‘practical usefulness to the public as a highway for trans-
portation.’”143  In addition, the fact that Morgan measured a river’s 
“capacity for getting material to market does not restrict the concept 
of usefulness for transport to the movement of commodities.”144  Ac-
cordingly, “the concept of usefulness for transport” must include the 
movement of people as rivers no longer serve as a primary method of 
moving commodities.145 
The court’s rationale for including travel as a guideline for de-
termining if a waterway has practical public utility is unsound and it 
may have unintentionally expanded the scope of the navigable-in-fact 
doctrine to the detriment of private property rights.  First, the court 
used New York’s current statutory Navigation Law definition of nav-
igability as persuasive authority when interpreting a common-law 
doctrine originating in 1866.146  Second, and of greater significance, 
the court overlooked the importance that Morgan placed on commer-
cial utility when the Morgan court expanded the navigable easement 
to include floating logs.  The court in ALC found even though “evolv-
ing necessities and circumstances may warrant a different emphasis 
regarding a river’s usefulness, the central premise of the common-law 
remains the same—in order to be navigable-in-fact, a river must pro-
vide practical utility to the public as a means for transportation.”147  
This reasoning; however, does not accurately reflect the central prem-
ise of the common law as understood by the court in Morgan nor 
does the law remain the same after its decision.  In Morgan the cen-
tral premise was the navigable-in-fact doctrine needed to include 
 
however, failed to distinguish the practical public utility between commercial travel 
and recreational travel when finding that “recreational use can be considered in ad-
dition to commercial use” in a navigable-in-fact analysis. Adirondack League Club, 
Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196. 
142 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195. 




147 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.  
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floatability to further commerce.148  In ALC; however, the central 
premise is that Morgan is outdated as rivers no longer serve as com-
mercial highways.149  Thus, evidence of a river’s capacity to support 
recreational use is relevant to determine whether a waterway has 
practical utility for transportation.  By solely focusing on transporta-
tion, the court in ALC misinterprets the traditional premise of the 
common law established in Morgan—that transportation on a water-
way furthered the public’s ability to trade goods.  The central premise 
of Morgan, even with a liberal interpretation, cannot be construed to 
mean that a waterway serves a practical public utility if it has the ca-
pacity to enable transportation for the purpose of travelling along it. 
b. Analysis of the Evidence 
The ALC court evaluated the South Branch’s navigability 
based on its new criterion: whether the river has practical utility for 
trade or travel.150  The court first analyzed the waterway’s practical 
utility for trade by examining the historical log-drive evidence.151  
The court found that the evidence in the record conflicted on the issue 
of whether “artificial means were necessary to render the South 
Branch capable of commercial use.”152  Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that it could not find as a matter of law whether the network of 
dams was necessary to accomplish the pre-1948 log-drives, meaning 
that the evidence was insufficient “to compel a conclusion that prac-
tical, commercial use of the South Branch occurred in its natural state 
and its ordinary volume.”153 
The court next addressed whether the South Branch could 
support unobstructed travel either periodically or seasonally based on 
the evidence of defendants’ recreational canoeing and kayaking 
trip.154  The court concluded that this evidence was insufficient, find-
ing that the single recreational trip was “not enough to demonstrate 
that the river periodically has sufficient natural volume for a suffi-
cient portion of the year to make it useful as a means for transporta-
 
148 Id. at 1194. 
149 Id. at 1195. 
150 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. 
151 Id. at 1196-97. 
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tion.”155  In addition, there was conflicting evidence regarding “(a) 
the river’s ability to sustain commercial boating or canoeing opera-
tions or (b) its capacity to float individual canoeing excursions for 
any given period or season.”156 
Although the court did not hold the South Branch was navi-
gable as a matter of law, the court’s analysis supports the position 
that recreational use alone is now sufficient to declare a waterway 
over private property navigable-in-fact.  For example, the court first 
found that the historical log-drive evidence could not support the 
conclusion that the commercial activity along the South Branch oc-
curred in the river’s “natural state and its ordinary volume.”157  This 
is a required factor under the Morgan navigable-in-fact analysis, and 
had the court strictly followed Morgan, this finding alone could have 
compelled the court to hold that summary judgment was improper.  
Instead, the court continued its analysis by examining the recreational 
use evidence to determine if the South Branch could support unob-
structed travel either seasonally or periodically—another element re-
quired under Morgan.158  The fact that the court continued its analysis 
demonstrates that the court’s holding and overall reasoning are not 
truly “in line with the traditional test of navigability.”159  Rather, a 
party may now seek to have a waterway declared navigable-in-fact 
without showing that the natural state of a river could support practi-
cal commercial use, but may instead demonstrate that only unob-
structed travel can occur on the river, even if such travel is evidence 
of “individual canoeing excursions for any given period or season.”160  
Accordingly, the ALC decision permits courts to now find a water-
way navigable-in-fact based on evidence showing that the natural ca-
pacity of the waterway permits individual canoeing trips for a suffi-
cient period of time throughout the year. 
The mode of analysis used by the court in ALC, with respect 
to recreational use, also differed from the analysis of recreational use 
by the lower appellate court and other New York courts have ana-
lyzed recreational use.  For example, the Third Department in ALC 
examined recreational use to determine if the natural state and ordi-
 
155 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198. 
156 Id. at 1198. 
157 Id. at 1197. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1194. 
160 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198. 
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nary volume of the South Branch had the capacity to support the his-
torical log-drives without the need of dams.161  In contrast, the Court 
of Appeals considered the historical log-drives on the issue of the 
river’s “natural state and ordinary volume,” and elected to examine 
the evidence of recreational use on another element, that is, whether 
“substantially unobstructed travel on the South Branch [could] occur 
periodically or seasonally.”162 
The Court of Appeals in ALC also expanded New York appel-
late court precedent in connection with how recreational use is evalu-
ated.  For example, in Fairchild v. Kraemer,,163 the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department considered evidence of recreational use 
when determining if the waterway at issue was navigable-in-fact.164  
The court stated that “pleasure boating may be considered on the sub-
ject of the stream’s capacity and the use of which it is susceptible.”165  
Evidence of pleasure boating, the court stated, could be used by the 
proponent of the navigable public easement to show that the natural 
state or condition of the waterway was susceptible to “trade, com-
merce or travel.”166  Thus, the court in Fairchild would have exam-
ined evidence of recreation use on the issue of whether the natural 
state of the subject waterway had the capacity for a commercial pur-
pose.  In addition, the Appellate Division, Third Department in Mo-
hawk Valley Ski Club v. Town of Duanesburg167 found the fact that a 
pond had “been used to float canoes and small boats for purely recre-
ational purposes . . . insufficient to demonstrate that the pond has any 
capacity or suitability for commercial transportation.”168  Both of the-
se examples considered recreational use on the issue of whether the 
waterway was susceptible of supporting a commercial purpose, but 
neither went as far as the court in ALC, which would have declared 
 
161 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 792.  The Third Department found that the 
South Branch’s “capacity for floating logs [was] supported by the recreational use 
of the river by canoeists.” Id. 
162 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197. 
163 Kraemer, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 823. 
164 Id. at 826. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 826. 
167 Mohawk, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 357. 
168 Id. at 360 (emphasis added).  The court in Mohawk Valley Ski Club found that 
the pond at issue was not navigable-in-fact because it lacked multiple termini by 
which the public may enter or leave the waterway and, therefore, lacked utility as a 
means of transportation. Id. 
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the South Branch navigable-in-fact based on its “capacity to float in-
dividual canoeing excursions for any given period or season.”169 
D. Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown  
In 2015, the Appellate Division, Third Department in Friends 
of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment by holding that the waterway at issue was “navi-
gable-in-fact and subject to a public right of navigation.”170  Like 
ALC, this case involved recreational canoeists who entered private 
property in order to use the waterway.171  The court’s analysis of rec-
reational use relied significantly on ALC to support its conclusion that 
the waterway was navigable-in-fact.172  In addition, the court’s evalu-
ation of the evidence greatly expanded the concept of “practical utili-
ty,”173 thus making it easier for the proponent of a public easement to 
establish that a waterway is navigable-in-fact with recreational use 
evidence. 
1. Factual Background 
In 1851, the State of New York conveyed thousands of acres 
of land to Benjamin Brandreth, an ancestor of the plaintiffs in 
Friends of Thayer Lake.174  The Brandreth property, commonly re-
ferred to as Mud Pond Parcel,175 is located in a secluded area of the 
Adirondack Mountains and has remained in plaintiffs’ family since 
the time of its conveyance.176  Mud Pond Parcel is surrounded by 
20,000 acres of forest preserve land known as the William C. Whit-
ney Wilderness Area (Wilderness Area).177  Until 1998, the Wilder-
ness Area was privately owned and therefore off-limits to the pub-
 
169 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198. 
170 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512. 
171 Id. at 506. 
172 Id. at 508-11. 
173 Id. at 511 (stating that “recreational and commercial uses are often inter-
twined” when considering “modern view[s] of a waterway’s utility”). 
174 Id. at 506. 
175 Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, No. 6803, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Hamilton Cty. Feb. 25, 2013). 
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lic.178  In 1998; however, New York State acquired the Wilderness 
Area and opened the preserve to the public.179  As a result, the public 
now had the ability to canoe on a network of waterways located with-
in the Wilderness Area known as the Lila Traverse without first hav-
ing to trespass over private property to gain access.180 
The focus in Friends of Thayer Lake involved a system of 
streams known as the Mud Pond Waterway (the Waterway), which 
runs across the northern edge of plaintiffs’ private property, Mud 
Pond Parcel.181  The Waterway connects two smaller bodies of water, 
Shingle Shanty Brook to the west and Lilypad Pond to the east, both 
of which are part of the Lila Traverse.182  After the Wilderness Area 
became public, the Department of Environmental Conservation 
(DEC) created a public carry-trail between Shingle Shanty Brook and 
Lilypad Pond so that canoers could navigate the Lila Traverse with-
out having to trespass onto plaintiffs’ private parcel.183 
In 2009, defendant Phil Brown, editor of a magazine called 
the Adirondack Explorer, set out on a two-day canoe trip to investi-
gate whether the Waterway running through Mud Pond Parcel was 
navigable-in-fact.184  Brown subsequently published an article in his 
magazine that documented his trip.185  The article, appropriately enti-
tled “Testing the Legal Waters,” concluded that the Waterway is, in 
fact, navigable and therefore should be open to the public.186 
Brown began his recreational canoeing trip at a public access 
point on Little Tupper Lake, located in the northeasterly portion of 
the land formerly known as the “William C. Whitney Wilderness Ar-
ea,” and headed west on the Lila Traverse.187  After a day and a half 
of travel, Brown reached Lilypad Pond.188  Just to reach Lilypad 





181 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 506. 
182 Id. 
183 Id.  A carry trail permits paddlers to carry their canoes on-foot wherever the 
water becomes too rough or too shallow to paddle through. 
184 Id. at 507. 
185 Id. 
186 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 507. 
187 See Phil Brown, Testing the Legal Waters, ADIRONDACK EXPLORER (Aug. 24, 
2009), http://www.adirondackexplorer.org/stories/testing-the-legal-waters. 
188 Brown, supra note 187, at 6. 
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Lila Traverse was not navigable, the longest being 1.75 miles.189  
When arriving at Lilypad Pond, Brown elected not to use the state-
created carry-trail, which avoided plaintiffs’ private land, and instead 
decided to paddle past the no trespassing signs and into the Water-
way.190  Brown admitted that a stretch of rapids made the Waterway 
impassable for about 500 feet, but he was able to portage around this 
section on a carry trail that the plaintiffs had constructed for their 
own use.191  Other than this portion, the Waterway, in Brown’s opin-
ion, “[was] obviously navigable in the everyday sense of the 
word.”192  Brown summed up his expedition writing, “[o]rdinarily, 
the trip requires four long carries, but I did it in just three . . . I avoid-
ed [the last carry] by canoeing through private land from Lilypad to 
Mud Pond and down the Mud Pond outlet to Shingle Shanty.”193 
2. Procedural History & Third Department’s 
Decision 
After learning of Brown’s trip, plaintiffs filed suit “seeking 
compensatory damages for trespass and a declaratory judgment that 
the Waterway is not navigable-in-fact.”194  Brown answered and as-
serted a number of affirmative defenses, primarily that the State was 
a necessary party.195  The Supreme Court for the County of Hamilton 
allowed New York State and the DEC to intervene as defendants.196  
The State defendants asserted that the Waterway is navigable-in-fact 
and sought an injunction to bar plaintiffs from interfering with travel 
on the Waterway.197  Both parties subsequently moved for summary 
judgment.198 
 
189 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 514 (Rose, J., dissenting). 
190 Id. at 507. 
191 Id. 
192 See Brown, supra note 187. 
193 See Brown, supra note 187. 




198 Id.  Both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division stated in their opin-
ions that they would have been inclined to “find triable issues of fact as to the navi-
gable character of the Waterway, but did not do so because the parties had asked 
the court to render a determination as a matter of law.” Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 
N.Y.S.3d at 507.  The Supreme Court pointed out one particular issue of fact that 
existed: “the weight to place upon the size and characteristics of the undisputed 500 
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The Supreme Court held that the Waterway is navigable-in-
fact and granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment.199  The 
court further found that plaintiffs had created a public nuisance by 
posting steel cables, no trespassing signs, and motion cameras along 
the boundary, and enjoined them from interfering with the public 
right of navigation.200 
Plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the Appellate Division for the 
Third Judicial Department.201  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that only 
evidence of commercial utility can be considered to prove navigabil-
ity.202  Defendants argued that under the New York Court of Appeals’ 
decision in ALC, evidence of recreational use may also be considered 
in the test for navigability.203 
The appellate court began its discussion by relying on ALC 
and explained that a waterway’s navigability must be determined 
based upon evidence of “its utility for travel or trade.”204  Applying 
this standard, the Friends of Thayer Lake court considered evidence 
in the form of testimony, affidavits, photographs, historical records, 
travel guidebooks, and maps.205  The court found particularly im-
portant the testimony of Donald Brandreth Potter, a member of plain-
tiffs’ family, and someone “who has lifelong familiarity with the Wa-
terway and its history.”206  Potter testified that even though the 
Waterway “is shallow in some areas and narrow, tortuous and crowd-
ed with plant growth in others, it is ‘generally floatable by canoe’ 
during periods of ordinary water.’”207  On the other hand, Potter stat-
ed that “[t]he rapids below Mud Pond are an exception . . . [and are] 
 
foot portage around the [Waterway] when determining navigability.” Friends of 
Thayer Lake, No. 6803, slip op. at 2-3. 
199 Friends of Thayer Lake, No. 6803, slip op. at 5. 
200 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512. 
201 Id. at 507. 
202 Brief for the Respondent at 7, Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, (No. 
518309), 2014 WL 10022708.  
203 Id. 
204 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509.  Previously, this determination 
turned on the waterway’s ability to support commercial transportation, but in Adi-
rondack League Club the Court of Appeals clarified that recreational use can also 
be considered as a factor in a navigable-in-fact determination. Adirondack League 
Club, 706 N.E.2d at 1196. 
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never canoeable.”208  He explained that this section of the Waterway 
was not navigable and that his family built and maintains a “500-foot 
carry trail” to avoid the Mud Pond rapids.209  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that Potter’s testimony established that the Waterway “is 
capable of canoe travel” and, therefore, “has sufficient natural vol-
ume for a sufficient portion of the year to make it useful as a means 
for transportation.”210  In other words, the court found that Potter’s 
testimony demonstrated that the Waterway has practical utility for 
travel.  It did not matter that the rapids below Mud Pond were never 
navigable.  On this evidence, the court found that the “relatively short 
Mud Pond rapids” did not render the Waterway non-navigable be-
cause “occasional natural obstructions do not destroy the navigability 
of a waterway.”211  In these circumstances, the navigable easement 
“gives rise to a public right to circumvent [the natural obstacle] by 
making use . . . of the beds and banks, including the right to portage 
on riparian lands.”212 
The court then examined whether the Waterway has practical 
utility for trade by discussing its actual and susceptible uses.213  Plain-
tiffs stated that the Brandreth family only used the Waterway for pri-
vate, recreational purposes, and argued that this should preclude a 
finding of navigability-in-fact.214  The court disagreed on the ground 
that the ALC test examines a waterway’s capacity for use, not just its 
actual use.215 
The court, in analyzing the actual and susceptible uses of the 
Waterway, began by noting that the plaintiffs’ property is located in a 
remote area without nearby roads, and that the plaintiffs have “al-




210 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509. 
211 Id. at 510. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 510-11.  It appears that this part of the court’s analysis is unnecessary.  
The navigable-in-fact standard established by the Court of Appeals in Adirondack 
League Club is whether a waterway “has practical utility for trade or travel.” Adi-
rondack League Club, 706 N.E.2d at 600.  Once the court in Friends of Thayer 
Lake found that the Mud Pond had practical utility for transportation, the court 
could have declared the waterway navigable-in-fact without having to discuss 
whether Mud Pond has practical utility for trade. Id. 
214 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510. 
215 Id. at 511. 
29
Ingber: Navigable-in-Fact Doctrine
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
482 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
Pond Camp from other parts of their property.”216  Although much of 
the actual use involved recreational hunting or fishing, the court 
found that that the family “also regularly used the Waterway for such 
utilitarian purposes as transporting goods and supplies to Mud Pond 
Camp.”217  For example, Potter’s testimony revealed that the family 
used the Waterway to transport, inter alia, “food, baggage, equip-
ment, bed, a stove and building materials” from the area now com-
prised of the Wilderness Area southward until reaching their proper-
ty.218  The court stated that even though the plaintiffs had used 
Waterway for their own private purposes, the evidence sufficiently 
demonstrated that the Waterway “has the capacity to transport similar 
goods for commercial purposes.”219  The court also noted that recrea-
tional and commercial uses are today often intertwined, as demon-
strated by the “testimony of the owner of an Adirondack outfitting 
and guide service, who stated that . . . he will include the Waterway 
in his commercial activity if it is judicially declared to be navigable-
in-fact.”220 
3. Practical Utility and The Implications of the 
Third Department’s Decision in Friends of 
Thayer Lake 
The court’s analysis and conclusion that the Waterway has 
capacity for trade substantially expands the common, everyday mean-
ing of the term “practical utility.”221  The court found that “recrea-
tional and commercial uses are often intertwined” based on evidence 
presented by the owner of an Adirondack tour guide company, who 
stated that he would include the Waterway in his business “if it is de-
clared to be navigable-in-fact.”222  While it is true that commercial 
 
216 Id. at 510. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 511. 
220 Id.  Even assuming, as the majority did, that recreational use today can consti-
tute evidence of a waterway’s capacity for commercial utility, the Waterway in 
Friends of Thayer Lake is still impracticable for such use because of its isolated na-
ture and the lengthy trek required to reach it.  Further, in the middle of the wilder-
ness, without the availability of emergency medical assistance or even public bath-
rooms such a commercial operation would likely pose substantial safety risks. Id. 
221 Id. at 509. 
222 Id. at 511. 
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and recreational can be intertwined in the proper case, the facts pre-
sented in Friends of Thayer Lake do not compel such a conclusion.  
Practical utility has not been defined by the courts, therefore the term 
should be understood in its ordinary meaning without forced con-
struction.223  In that connection, “practical” is commonly understood 
to mean “what is real rather than what is possible or imagined,”224 
while “utility” is defined as something with “the quality or state of 
being useful.”225  However, the court in Friends of Thayer Lake ex-
panded the concept of “practical utility” with respect to capacity for 
commercial use far beyond the term’s ordinary meaning of something 
that actually provides or is readily susceptible of providing the gen-
eral public with meaningful or useful commerce.226  It is doubtful, 
even with a liberal application of the navigable-in-fact doctrine,227 
that meaningful commerce can be conducted by a business providing 
kayaking expeditions through the Mud Pond Waterway.  First, the 
Waterway is in a remote area, and plaintiff’s property, located in the 
Town of Long Lake, Hamilton County, has a population of just over 
700 people.228  Second, the Waterway is not easily accessible to the 
public.229  The court noted that, “access to the Waterway remains dif-
ficult, requiring lengthy canoe travel across the Wilderness Area on 
various component lakes and streams of the Lila Traverse and several 
portages, the longest of which covers 1.75 miles.”230  As noted by the 
dissent, these conditions require that any recreationalist travelling 
along the Lila Traverse “must necessarily [be] physically fit and 
 
223 Cf. N.Y. STAT. Law § 94 (McKinney 2016) (stating that when interpreting a 
statute, words are to be construed in their “natural and obvious sense, without resort 
to forced construction”). 
224 Practical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/practical (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
225 See Utility, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/utility (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
226 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509. 
227 See, e.g., Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459 (stating that when a waterway is “so far 
navigable or floatable, in its natural state and ordinary capacity, as to be of public 
use in the transportation of property, the public claim to such use ought to be liber-
ally supported”) (emphasis added). 
228 Profile of General Population & Housing Characteristics: 2010 – Long Lake 
Town, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk 
(last visited May 3, 2016). 
229 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 514. 
230 Id. at 511. 
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equipped with the necessary gear to paddle and portage through the 
remote backcountry over the course of multiple days.”231  Thus, the 
remote location of both the Waterway and plaintiffs’ property, the 
fact that very few people live in the Town of Long Lake, along with 
the difficulty of even accessing Mud Pond, weaken the court’s con-
clusion that the Waterway has practical public utility for trade.232  It 
is unlikely that the Waterway is capable of serving much, if any, 
practical public utility when only 711 people live in the area sur-
rounding plaintiffs’ remote property.233  Likewise, even those who 
wish to travel along the Lila Traverse must be in excellent physical 
condition to even reach the Waterway, thus lessening the number of 
persons who would benefit from the public navigable servitude.  
However, the rationale employed by the court in Friends of Thayer 
Lake stretches the concept of practical utility whereby a waterway 
may be found to have public utility even under circumstances where 
only a marginal segment of the population would benefit from the 
navigable-in-fact determination.234  The fact that an outdoor expedi-
tion company can now hypothetically conduct a kayaking business 
comprised solely of physically fit customers willing to kayak in a re-
mote area significantly jeopardizes any expectation landowners have 
to exclude others from using a waterway on their private property. 
The Friends of Thayer Lake navigable-in-fact determination 
should also be alarming to private property owners because the court 
failed to acknowledge critical differences in the facts at issue with the 
facts presented to the court in ALC.  For example, the court in 
Friends of Thayer Lake—without much discussion—dismissed the 
“[p]laintiffs’ arguments pertaining to the Waterway’s remote na-
ture.”235  Instead, the court simply stated that the navigable-in-fact 
doctrine “is more concerned with a waterway’s capacity and charac-
teristics than its location”236; however, the only characteristic the 
court used to support the Waterway’s navigable-in-fact status was 
based on the multiple termini from which the public can gain ac-
cess.237  The location of a waterway in navigable-in-fact cases, alt-
 
231 Id. at 515 (Rose, J., dissenting). 
232 Id. at 516 (Rose, J., dissenting). 
233 Id. at 516-17 (Rose, J., dissenting). 
234 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 517 (Rose, J., dissenting). 
235 Id. at 511. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 511-12. 
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hough not a controlling factor in New York precedent, has generally 
been on private property in high population areas and the subject wa-
terway typically provides or had at one point served as a highway for 
commerce.238  In comparison, although the court in ALC could not 
conclude as a matter of law that the subject waterway, the South 
Branch, was navigable-in-fact, it was agreed that the South Branch 
had once been “one of the five busiest rivers in New York for the 
transport of logs.”239  The South Branch’s location as a major com-
mercial highway, a factor important to the Appellate Division, Third 
Department,240 advances the position that the location of a waterway 
strengthens the public’s right to a navigable easement because of the 
waterway’s utility as a beneficial highway for trade.241  The Water-
way in Friends of Thayer Lake; however, is located in a remote area 
and the Waterway never served the public with practical utility.242  
The court in Friends of Thayer Lake analysis, or lack thereof, of the 
location of the Mud Pond in the navigable-in-fact analysis and its de-
cision to not treat a waterway’s location as a relevant characteristic 
should cause concern to private property owners.243  Reliance on this 
decision by subsequent courts jeopardizes private property rights, as 
waterways may now be found navigable-in-fact regardless of location 
and with only marginal evidence showing that the waterway serves a 
practical public utility for commerce. 
The effort required to reach the Mud Pond Waterway was also 
 
238 See, e.g., Palmer, 3 Cai. at 310 (involving a dispute over whether the defend-
ants committed a nuisance by building a dam along the Hudson River).  The Hud-
son River, unlike the Mud Pond in Friends of Thayer Lake, historically has been 
linked to public travel and commerce.  For example, Cadwallader Colden, a sur-
veyor in the English province of New York in 1724, commented that the natural 
conditions of the Hudson River enabled vessels to “always sail as well by night as 
by day, and [has] the advantage of the tide upwards as well as downwards.”   
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, WEDDING OF THE WATERS: THE ERIE CANAL AND THE 
MAKING OF A GREAT NATION 49, 51 (2005).  Likewise, the Hudson River served as 
an artery of commerce connecting Albany and New York City, two populated cit-
ies, by only 150 miles. Id. at 51; see also Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 455-56 (stating that 
the one hundred sixty mile long Raquette River connected towns located in the Ad-
irondack Region in upstate New York). 
239 Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195. 
240 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 792. 
241 Id. at 792-93. 
242 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510. 
243 Id. at 508-11. 
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not a detriment to the court in Friends of Thayer Lake,244 thus making 
it easier for a proponent to establish that a river is navigable-in-fact.  
As previously noted, accessing the Waterway is difficult as the public 
is required to undergo “lengthy canoe travel across the Wilderness 
Area . . . and several portages, the longest of which covers 1.75 
miles.”245  Thus, those members of the public wishing to travel the 
Lila Traverse must be physically fit and have a high level of skill to 
even reach Mud Pond Parcel.  On the other hand, the facts presented 
in ALC is more in line with the common understanding of practical 
public utility for trade as it relates to operating a recreational 
kayaking business.  In ALC, over three-fourths of the South Branch 
that passed “through plaintiff’s property is easily paddled by novice 
canoeists and the remainder of the river requires intermediate 
skill.”246  Accordingly, even though the New York Court of Appeals 
in ALC did not find the South Branch navigable-in-fact as a matter of 
law, the segment of the river had the capability of benefitting a wide 
range of the public as even novice recreationalists were capable of 
paddling it.247  This in contrast with Friends of Thayer Lake where 
the court held the Mud Pond Waterway navigable-in-fact on a motion 
for summary judgment, even though the waterway had the capability 
of providing utility to only highly skilled canoeists.248 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Navigable-in-fact waterways located on private property sub-
ject the realty to a navigable easement in favor of the public.  This 
doctrine first gained attention in 1866 by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Morgan v. King where the court established New York’s 
navigable-in-fact common law.249  The court in Morgan expanded the 
doctrine from its English common law roots to permit a waterway to 
be subject to a public navigable easement upon a showing that the 
natural state of a river had the capacity to float logs in a condition fit 
for market.250  Although the court expanded on English law, the court 
 
244 Id. at 511. 
245 Id. 
246 ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90. 
247 Id. 
248 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509-10. 
249 Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. 
250 Id. 
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carefully balanced the benefit to the public should the waterway be 
declared navigable against the detriment to the landowner by subject-
ing the property to a public easement.251 
The careful balance employed by the court in Morgan; how-
ever, has been abandoned.  In Friends of Thayer Lake, the court 
found that recreational use may be used as evidence to establish that a 
waterway has the capacity to support commercial recreational busi-
ness.252  While this finding may not seem significant as whitewater 
rafting is a popular recreational activity, the facts in Friends of 
Thayer Lake disrupt any settled expectations that landowners have to 
exclude others from their private property.  In that case, the court 
held as a matter of law that a waterway located on the private proper-
ty in a remote area and without any actual history of being used as a 
highway for commerce as navigable-in-fact.253  Accordingly, this sets 
a precedent for a waterway to be declared navigable-in-fact regard-
less of its location. 
The Third Department’s decision in Friends of Thayer Lake 
has been granted appeal by the New York Court of Appeals and oral 
argument was made in March 2016.254  The court should take this op-
portunity to reexamine its precedent and begin considering the loca-
tion of the waterway in its navigable-in-fact analysis.  This will help 
rebalance the public’s interest in using waterways for recreation 
against a landowner’s expectation to exclude others from the realty.  
For example, when weighing the public interest against the landown-
er’s interest, the court can find that the public utility of burdening 
private property with a navigable easement is greater when the wa-
terway is located in densely populated areas than when the property 
is located in remote areas.  At the same time, the landowners’ expec-
tation of excluding the public from travelling on waterways situated 
on their property is highest when the property is in a secluded area 
isolated from others and lowest when it is readily accessible to a large 
segment of the population. 
It is unlikely that the Court of Appeals will take this oppor-
tunity to rebalance New York’s navigable-in-fact law.  It is also im-
 
251 Id. at 461. 
252 Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 511. 
253 Id. at 510-11. 
254 Oral Argument Archive, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/arguments/2016/Mar16/Mar16_OA.htm (last vis-
ited May 6, 2016). 
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probable that the court will reverse the Third Department’s decision 
in Friends of Thayer Lake as the appellate court was following the 
precedent established by the Court of Appeals in ALC.255  Likewise, it 
is doubtful that the legislature will intervene as it is New York’s poli-
cy “to develop and manage the basic resources of water . . . to the end 
that the state may fulfill its responsibility as trustee of the environ-
ment for the present and future generations.”256  This responsibility 
likewise includes the duty of assuring the greatest range “of benefi-
cial uses of the environment . . . .”257  Thus, a judicial determination 
that a waterway is navigable-in-fact means that the state of New York 
holds the water in trust with a duty to preserve the waterway for the 
widest range of beneficial uses, which includes recreation.258  Ac-
cordingly, without a drastic change in approach by the New York 
Court of Appeals when it reviews the Third Department’s determina-
tion in Friends of Thayer Lake, landowners should expect their prop-
erty to be burdened with a navigable public easement. 
 
 
255 706 N.E.2d at 1194 (holding that recreational use evidence “is in line with the 
traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river has a practical utility for 
trade or travel”). 
256 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 1-0101(2) (McKinney 2016). 
257 Id. § 1-0101(3)(b). 
258 Id. § 15-2701. 
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